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From means and variances to
persons and patterns
James W. Grice*
Department of Psychology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA
A novel approach for conceptualizing and analyzing data from psychological studies is
presented and discussed. This approach is centered on model building in an effort to
explicate the structures and processes believed to generate a set of observations. These
models therefore go beyond the variable-based, path models in use today which are
limiting with regard to the types of inferences psychologists can draw from their research.
In terms of analysis, the newer approach replaces traditional aggregate statistics such as
means, variances, and covariances with methods of pattern detection and analysis. While
these methods are person-centered and do not require parametric assumptions, they
are both demanding and rigorous. They also provide psychologists with the information
needed to draw the primary inference they often wish tomake from their research; namely,
the inference to best explanation.
Keywords: observation oriented modeling, integrated model, inference to best explanation, mean, variable-based
modeling
Introduction
In his erudite and now classic book Constructing the Subject, Danziger (1990) describes how
psychology came to be dominated by an approach toward data conceptualizing and analysis he
dubbed the “triumph of the aggregate.” Charting the meteoric rise of tables of means, variances,
correlations, and other aggregate statistics reported in psychology journals from the early to mid-
1900s, Danziger (1990) lamented the corresponding demise of the individual subject, or person,
in psychology. Aggregate statistics were moreover shown to rise in prominence despite cautionary
claims regarding their hegemony (Sidman, 1952; Bakan, 1954), including a critical appraisal offered
by none other than Skinner (1956) himself. Modern scholars point out the issues raised over
50 years ago have not gone away and that, in fact, psychology’s over-reliance on aggregate statistics
is likely thwarting scientific progress by hindering the development of theories which can explain
the behavior of individual persons (Valsiner, 1986; Valsiner et al., 2014). Lamiell (1997, 2003,
2013) has gone to great lengths to remind personality psychologists, in particular, that between-
person differences or effects discovered through aggregate statistical analysis do not necessarily
exist at the level of the individual (see also, Carlson, 1971). The Big Five personality factors, for
example, can readily be found in aggregated data, but the factors do not regularly emerge from
the analysis of individual responses (Grice et al., 2006; see also, Molenaar and Campbell, 2009).
The Power Law of Learning is another example phenomenon that can be seen in the aggregate
but not at the level of the individual, thus raising the question of whether or not it is truly a
law (see Heathcote et al., 2000, as reported by Speelman and McGann, 2013). There is a genuine
and potentially hazardous disconnect, then, between conclusions drawn from between-person,
aggregate statistics and statements or theoriesmeant to offer insight into the psychology of individual
persons.
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In this paper we present a framework for conceptualizing and
analyzing data that does not rely on traditional aggregate statistics
such as the mean, median, variance, covariation, etc. Instead, this
approach—like Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA; Tukey, 1977;
Behrens andYu, 2003)—relies primarily upon techniques of visual
examination to detect and explain dominant patterns within a
set of observations. Going beyond EDA, however, this approach
can incorporate patterns that are generated a priori on the basis
of theory, thus promoting model building and development. It
also synchronizes visual examination of the data with transparent
analyses that (1) identify those individuals whose observations are
consistent with the predicted or identified pattern, and (2) provide
an index of a given pattern’s robustness within a sample. This
approach is generally referred to as observation oriented modeling
(OOM; Grice, 2011, 2014), and we will compare and contrast
its guiding principles and techniques with those of traditional
statistics using a study and accompanying data that are contrived
but nonetheless based on genuine psychological research. We will
also draw, in part, upon Haig’s (2005; 2014) abductive theory of
method (ATOM) to argue that this approach provides the types
of inferences psychologists normally seek from their data but are
unable to make on the basis of traditional statistical analyses.
The overall goal is to show that by departing from the modal
research practice of modern psychology (Lebel and Peters, 2011),
a novel and more rigorous path that does not confuse aggregates
for persons may be paved for future researchers.
An Example Study in Rejection
Pick up almost any research paper on human psychology,
and there you will find written in the Introduction statements
about persons. You will not likely find statements about
means, variances, or even covariances; although you might
find descriptions of relationships between different attributes or
qualities. Even these relationships, however, will be discussed
in the context of living persons rather than aggregate statistics.
Writing about rejection and interpersonal coping, for example,
Ayduk et al. (2003) claim “: : :research suggests that people
who fear and expect rejection employ to a greater degree
both overt (i.e., verbal aggression) and covert (i.e., withdrawal,
avoidance) negative coping strategies that ultimately undermine
their significant relationships and their mental health” (p. 435).
Here rejection and interpersonal coping are foremost recognized
as universal features of human experience. It is indeed difficult
to imagine any adult who could not recall an instance of being
rejected by another person or recount a situation in life that
was coped with in a negative, unfruitful manner. The authors
moreover infer from previous research—naturally based on a
limited number of individuals—that rejection and coping are
causally connected. The inference is therefore from samples of
persons to persons in general, as is clear with the authors’ use
of the word “people.” Concomitant with this inference is the
conclusion that rejection and coping are causally connected, not at
the aggregate or even group level, but at the level of the person. For
any given individual, then, the chronic expectation of rejection
(likely developed fromahistory of being rejected by others) plays a
causal role in the generation of negative coping strategies. Howdid
the authors draw such inferences, and are these types of inferences
truly warranted when made on the basis of results obtained from
traditional, aggregate statistics? The answer to the second question
is “no,” and to understand how psychologists typically draw such
conclusions from their analyses, we must work patiently and
carefully through an example study.
Continuing with the topic at hand, rejection can be produced
and studied in the laboratory by psychologists (e.g., Downey and
Feldman, 1996; Ayduk et al., 2003). Consider, for instance, a
male college student (viz., “the participant”) who walks into a
laboratory and is informed that he will be interacting, via the
Internet, with another male student seated at another computer
across campus. The participant is asked to provide a short
biography to share and is then given a corresponding biography
from his counterpart on the other side of campus. The biography
presents a person who is kind and inquisitive and likely a pleasure
to interact with in an informal social setting. After the participant
reads the biography and prepares for the online interaction, the
experimenter receives a phone call and informs the participant
that his counterpart has now chosen not to participate in the
online discussion and is instead withdrawing from the study.
What is the participant to make of this unexpected decision?
The experimenter’s hope is that the student will in fact interpret
the counterpart’s decision as a rejection of the participant based
on his shared biography. The experimenter moreover expects
the participant to subsequently experience negative emotions,
make negative self-attributions, and to form a negative inclination
toward his rejecting counterpart.With the phone call and rejection
completed, the experimenter then asks the participant to judge
the counterpart on qualities such as intelligence, popularity,
and friendliness using a 6-point rating scale. These ratings
essentially provide the student with an opportunity to express his
displeasure with the rejecting partner. After making his ratings,
the participant is finally debriefed and informed of the deception;
viz., no other student was involved in the study, and the biography
and ostensible rejection were therefore not genuine.
Now imagine over the course of a semester eighty individual
students walking into the psychologist’s laboratory and being
guided through these same procedures. With each and every
student the experimenter’s expectations will be the same, because
within her mind is a model. Perhaps it is a model that is only
crudely elaborated, but it is a model nonetheless that is meant to
explain the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of each individual
student (person) in the study. What might this model look like?
The most rigorous way to express the model is via a picture like
that shown in Figure 1. Such pictures are referred to as iconic
or integrated models because they provide a visual snapshot of
the structures and processes, or causes and effects, at work in
the laboratory (i.e., at work in the participant, experimenter, and
setting) during the study. As can be seen on the left side of
Figure 1, the model depicts two conditions in the study. The top
part of the model, demarcated by the bold line, represents what
takes place in the study as described in detail above. The bottom
part of the model will be described later.
The model also demarcates three important points of
interaction between the experimenter and participant. The
purpose of the first interaction, from the perspective of the
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FIGURE 1 | Integrated model for rejection study.
experimenter, is to create within the mind of the participant an
expectation of an online interaction with another student across
campus. The pentagon enclosing the image of the participant and
counterpart joined by a “+” sign represents a simple or complex
judgment. In this instance, the participant judges that he will
be interacting with the other student, and that the interaction
will be positive (given the biography and the experimenter’s
instructions). The circle enclosing the image of the counterpart
represents certain predicates (predicative adjectives, predicative
nouns) based on the biography. For example, the biography
describes the counterpart as “a student,” “a psychology major,”
“outgoing,” etc. The counterpart student is thus known through
the neutral and positive descriptive nouns and adjectives given in
the biography.
The purpose of the second interaction (focusing on rejecting
the condition) is to inform the participant that the other student
has chosen not to participate in the discussion after having
read the participant’s biographical statement. It is not perfectly
clear or stated plainly, however, if the counterpart is rejecting
the participant, but it is the experimenter’s expectation that the
participant will interpret this decision as a personal rejection
based on his own biographical statement. The phone call is
therefore considered to be an efficient cause; that is, a cause
that proceeds its effect in time leading to its production or
change (denoted by an arrow labeled “Ef ” in the model; see
Grice, 2014). The resulting judgment of the counterpart rejecting
the participant is represented by the pentagon in the second
interaction of the study. It is also accompanied by a second effect
of the phone call; specifically, the simple judgment that the two
will not communicate via the Internet after all.
The judged rejection then operates as an efficient cause
of negative self-predications (negative self-attributions) by the
participant. These negative self-predications are represented by
the circle derogatorily labeled “Loser” enclosing the participant
in the second interaction of the study. Hurt feelings, represented
by a diamond labeled “Hurt” enclosing the participant, also result
from the judged rejection. Finally, these experiences occurring
simultaneously within the participant cause him (as an efficient
cause) to adopt a negative disposition toward the counterpart.
This negative disposition may occur consciously, for instance, if
the participant were to think disparaging thoughts such as “well,
that guy’s a jerk forwastingmy time” or “I always knewpsychology
majors were unstable.”
Finally, the purpose of the third interaction is to provide the
participant with an opportunity to make explicit judgments about
his rejecting counterpart. As can be seen on the right side of
Figure 1, the participant rates his counterpart using a 6-point
scale anchored by “I don’t agree at all” and “I agree strongly.”
The participant is asked to use the scale for nine adjectives
that may describe the counterpart (intelligent, popular, friendly,
etc.). Use of the scale is considered to be a complex judgment
task as indicated by its enclosure in a pentagon. What value,
or potential range of values, should the participant choose? At
this point, the model is not sufficiently developed to specify
exactly which values will be chosen, but it does explicate the most
proximate cause behind the selection. Specifically, the participant
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will choose a value that will result in positive feelings and positive
self-attributions, as indicated by the diamond labeled “Positive”
and the circle labeled “Winner” in the figure. He is therefore
attempting to reach a goal through his rating, and goals operate
as final causes in human behavior (see Rychlak, 1988; Grice,
2014). The arrow therefore points from the positive feelings and
positive self-attributions and is labeled “Fi” for “final cause.”
Here the participant is essentially trying to make himself feel
better through the rating judgment by discounting the source
of his negative feelings and negative self-attributions (viz., the
counterpart). It is therefore reasonable to posit that the participant
will choose one of the low values on the scale (1, 2, 3), which
would ostensibly indicate negative judgments of unintelligent,
unpopular, unfriendly, etc.
At the end of themodel (bottom right-hand corner of Figure 1)
is the only “output” the experimenter observes; namely, the circled
ratings for each adjective. No other attempts are made in the
study to observe the predications, judgments, or feelings of the
participant. Nonetheless, the figure spells out very clearly, for
everyone to see, the structures and processes thought to be at work
by the experimenter when the participant is ostensibly rejected.
Finally, the model also shows a second condition of the study in
which the participant is told that, due to a computer malfunction,
the counterpart will not be able to take part in the discussion.
The participant is still asked to rate his counterpart, but as can be
seen in the model, all of the important predications, judgments,
feelings, and causes are no longer present. His rating is driven by
the biographical sketch, as an efficient cause, remembered from
the beginning of the study. In this case, it would be reasonable to
posit that the participant will choose one of the high values on
the scale (4, 5, 6) due to the positive content of the sketch. Again,
for both the rejecting and non-rejecting conditions, however,
predictions for the scale values are not explicitly provided by the
model.
Three Important Inferences
The integrated (iconic) model in Figure 1 facilitates three
inferences the psychologist wishes to make through her
research efforts—even if she is not consciously aware of these
inferences—and they are the types of inferences described at
the beginning of this paper. The first is known as an abductive
inference (or simply abduction) which has its roots in Aristotelian
philosophy and was developed and popularized by the American
philosopher Charles S. Peirce (Haig, 2005; Flórez, 2014). In
order to understand this inference, let us suppose that all of the
participants in the rejecting condition selected “I don’t agree at
all” for each and every adjective as applied to the counterpart.
The data obtained from the study are recorded as whole numbers
valued 1 through 6, and here all of the observed values for the
rejected participants are 1’s. Why do the numbers show this
striking pattern? The experimenter’s answer to this question, that
is her conclusion or inference, is that the data are patterned in
this manner because of the structures and processes detailed in
the model. The specific form of this abductive inference can be
represented as follows:
1’s have been observed for the rejected participants.
If the structured processes in Figure 1 took place, 1’s would
have been observed.
Therefore, the structured processes in Figure 1 took place.
A key feature of the inference is that, unlike induction, it appeals
to explanation (viz., the structures and processes diagrammed
in Figure 1). The conclusion is also uncertain or provisional,
unlike conclusions reached through strict deductive reasoning.
This uncertainty rests partly upon the iconicmodel itself as it is not
sufficiently developed to predict that only 1’s will be selected by
the participants. Moreover, it is not clear if 1’s should be selected
for all nine adjectives, or if 2’s and 3’s are also expected since
they lie below the mid-point of the scale, ostensibly conveying
a negative judgment. Indeed, it is not clear why a 6-point rating
scale is being used rather than, for instance, a 5-point scale or
a binary judgment task. These uncertainties are part and parcel
of the inference being sought and they should not be viewed
as reasons for abandoning the explanatory model. Instead, these
insufficiencies should be viewed as a call to make improvements
to the model in Figure 1 through refinement and extension.
The model can be refined by changing its existing components;
for example, the exact emotions felt by the participant can be
elaborated, or the 6-point scale can be justified and predictions
included about how the participant should behave with regard
to the scale. The model can be extended by adding additional
components; for example, perhaps not every participant
will construe the counterpart’s actions as rejection, and the
determining factors for making such an interpretation can be
added to the model. Of course the entire model itself can be tested
against and perhaps superseded by a competing model (such as
a Freudian view of hostility). In this regard, in particular, the
experimenter is seeking an inference to best explanation, which is
a type of scientifically useful abduction with the general form,
D is a collection of data
H (an hypothesis) would, if true, explain D
No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does
Therefore, H is probably true
The conclusion is again uncertain, but the continual striving
to thoroughly evaluate, improve upon, or replace a given model
seems to capture the investigative spirit of modern science, at least
as it is idealized. In any case it is easy to see why Haig (2014),
in his ATOM, regards inference to best explanation as central to
developing a proper understanding of science.
The third inference sought by the experimenter is an attempt
to draw a conclusion about persons, in general, from her
specific sample of individuals in her particular study. The
model in Figure 1 is clearly tied to the study designed by the
experimenter and is therefore applicable, she hopes, to each and
every participant in her study. Beyond these persons, however,
the components of the model provide a potential explanation
for how persons, in general, might react to being rejected. The
second interaction between the experimenter and participant,
for instance, shows a causal link between the judgment of being
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rejected by another person and the negative self-attributions and
feelings experienced by the participant. The third interaction
moreover shows that the proximate cause of a negative, explicit
judgment toward a rejecting person is a final cause resulting in
positive feelings and self-attributions. Presuming the observations
do in fact support the model in her study, the experimenter can
then argue that these components of the model may offer valid
explanations of howpersons react to rejection in situations outside
the laboratory. In doing so, the psychologist will be reasoning
inductively, moving from the specific to the general, and it is in
this way that psychologists typically seek to generalize beyond
their samples of participants and particular laboratories.
The three types of inference sought by the experimenter in
this example are therefore (1) abduction, (2) inference to best
explanation, and (3) inductive generalization. All three inferences
are facilitated by the integrated, iconic model in Figure 1; indeed,
it could be argued that such models are indispensable for making
these inferences. In any case the inferences are clearly important,
and as noted at the beginning of this paper, they are the types
of inferences encountered in the Introduction and Discussion
sections of journal articles published throughout psychology. It
is also important to point out that none of these inferences is
tied explicitly to a mean, median, mode, variance, or any other
aggregate statistic that can be computed froma sample of data. The
integrated model was designed without any statistical procedure
in mind and without the restriction of only including features that
can be understood quantitatively. All 10 of Aristotle’s categories
of being, and all four of his causes can be incorporated into
an integrated model (see Grice et al., 2012; Grice, 2014). The
theoretical horse, so-to-speak, is therefore in front of the data
analytic cart, as it should be. In more sophisticated language, we
are not letting our methods determine our metaphysics (Rychlak,
1988).
One Underwhelming Inference
When psychologists argue they are using statistics to generalize
beyond their samples, it is important to realize most believe
they are generalizing in the manner described above; namely,
making an abductive inference to best explanation or making
an inductive inference about persons in general. Unfortunately,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, nothing could be further
from the truth. By using traditional statistical methods that rely
on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST; viz., traditional p-
values), psychologists are instead routinely making an inference
to a population parameter, which is far less informative and far
less useful for building scientific theories than the three inferences
drawn from integrated models described above.
To demonstrate this ubiquitous type of inference, let us now
consider the condition in which the participant is told that his
counterpart cannot participate in the online discussion because
of a computer malfunction. With this comparison group in place,
and following modal research practice (Lebel and Peters, 2011),
the experimenter now thinks about the study using the variable-
based model in Figure 2. As can be seen, this model is comprised
of an independent variable (viz., group) and dependent variable
(viz., popularity rating) connected with a line that represents
their relationship or correlation. The negative sign above the
FIGURE 2 | Variable-based model for rejection study.
line indicates that those in the rejecting condition are expected
to, on average, provide lower ratings than those in the non-
rejecting condition. In order to keep everything simple, we will
henceforth only consider the rating for “popular” in the analyses.
Given the dichotomous group membership variable and rating
scale with values ranging from 1 to 6, the experimenter follows
standard protocol and analyzes the data with an independent
samples t-test.Her results, obtained from160 participants, reveal a
statistically significant difference between the rejecting (M= 4.20,
SD = 0.40) and non-rejecting (M = 4.50, SD = 1.21) groups,
t(96.23) =  2.10, p < 0.04, d = 0.33, CI0:95:  0.58,  0.02.
The difference is also consistent with expectation, with the
rejecting group yielding a lower mean than the non-rejecting
group.
What inference can she draw from these results, assuming
she has met or properly adjusted for all of the assumptions
of the statistical test? Having used NHST, the experimenter
posited two populations from which she drew her samples: a
population of persons experiencing rejection in the study, and a
population of persons not experiencing rejection in the study. The
populations in this example, as in most studies in psychology, are
entirely imaginary (Berk and Freedman, 2003); but nonetheless
a mean rating value is presumed to exist for each, designated
as m1 and m2. The null hypothesis is that the two population
means are equal (H0: m1 = m2) and by declaring her results
as “statistically significant” she has rejected this hypothesis and
concluded (inferred) that the two populationmeans are not equal.
She can consider the difference between the population means as
a parameter to be estimated as well (viz., mdiff = m1   m2) and
then provide a point estimate for what she thinks the difference
might be (viz., 4.20   4.50 =  0.30). She can also provide an
interval with an assigned level of confidence for possible values
of the difference (viz., CI0:95:  0.58, 0.02).
With the point and interval estimates in hand, it is clear the
psychologist is attempting to make an inference to a population
parameter (mdiff), which is presumably fixed at some value. This
inference is the only one she can rationally make; and the term
“rationally” should be used loosely here because the low observed
p-value (p < 0.04) does not provide the probability of the null
hypothesis being true, and therefore worthy of rejection. The
p-value instead indicates the two-tailed probability of obtaining
a t-value of at least 2.10, assuming the hull hypothesis is true
(see Cohen, 1994). Regardless, she cannot make an abductive
inference due to the simplicity and nature of the variable-based
model. The model is not explanatory as it does not present the
structures and processes underlying the observations. It simply
conveys the mean difference between two variables for arbitrarily
defined populations. According to Haig’s ATOM such a model
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TABLE 1 | Statistics and independent samples t-test results for three studies.
Condition
Rejecting Non-rejecting
Sample M SD M SD Mdiff d t p CI0:95
1 4.20 0.40 4.50 1.21  0.30 0.33  2.10 0.037  0.58,  0.02
2 4.20 2.24 4.80 1.34  0.60 0.33  2.06 0.042  1.18,  0.023
3 4.20 0.89 4.50 0.93  0.30 0.33  2.10 0.038  0.58,  0.02
The t-values and p-values for Samples 1 and 2 were adjusted for violations of the homogeneity of population variances assumption. All sample sizes were equal to 80.
with the accompanying parameter estimation may contribute
to phenomena detection, which can play an important role in
science, but the psychologistmust be clear that the only conclusion
she can draw from her analysis is that, provided the assumptions
for the independent samples t-test have been met or adjusted for
appropriately, the mean population difference is not 0, consistent
with expectation, and is instead estimated with 95% confidence to
be encompassed by values ranging from -0.02 to -0.58. That is all.
The experimenter also cannot make an inductive inference to
people in general as her hypotheses and analysis are constrained
to means. She cannot, therefore, write statements such as
“people who are rejected will rate the rejecting person as less
popular than those who are not rejected” or “rejected persons,
compared to non-rejected persons, considered the counterpart to
be unpopular.” In order to be true to her model and analyses, she
must restrict her inferential statements to population means or
the difference between them. Moreover, she must be careful to
avoid the following erroneous conclusions from her statistically
significant finding:
 Because my result was statistically significant, it will likely
replicate across independent samples of participants.
 My result is not likely due to chance given the low p-value.
 The null hypothesis is probably false; that is, the probability the
null hypothesis is true is less than five percent.
 My research hypothesis is probably true.
Lambdin (2011) reports a more complete list of twelve
such errors commonly made by researchers in psychology,
education, sociology, medicine, and other disciplines who rely
on null hypothesis significance testing (i.e., common p-values) to
determine the scientific value of their results.
Getting Beyond Aggregate Statistics and
NHST
A side-by-side comparison of the models in Figures 1 and 2
shows clearly the integrated model is much more informative
and rigorous than the variable-based model. The arguments
above have also shown that the integrated model provides a
gateway for the experimenter to make the types of inferences she
truly wishes to make, whereas the variable-based model permits
only a restricted, low information inference to a population
parameter. In order to drive home the point that the latter
inference is low in information, let us consider two additional
FIGURE 3 | Means and standard errors for rejecting and non-rejecting
groups for each of the three samples.
samples of participants collected by the same experimenter using
the exact same experimental protocol with a rejecting and non-
rejecting condition. The descriptive statistics, t-values, p-values,
and confidence intervals for all three samples are reported in
Table 1, and the means and standard errors are displayed in bar
graphs in Figure 3. As can be seen in the table, using these metrics
shemay conclude that the initial results have been replicated in the
two new studies. The effect sizes, in particular, are equal (d= 0.33)
when reported with two decimals of precision.
What do we really know about these data based on Table 1 and
Figure 3? Simple bubble plots surprisingly indicate that important
information has been overlooked by focusing only on the tabled
statistics. The bubble-plot in Figure 4 for the first and original
data set shows radical differences between the two groups with
respect to the variability and distributions of their scores. While
an overwhelming majority of participants in the rejecting group
chose 4’s, participants in the non-rejecting condition chose values
ranging from 2 to 6. The second bubble-plot indicates a radical
divide in the distribution for the rejecting group, with participants
choosing only 1’s, 2’s, or 6’s; whereas the distribution for the
non-rejecting group shows skew toward the lower values on the
scale. Finally, the third bubble-plot indicates the observed values
are distributed similarly across the 6-point scale, with a slight
tendency for participants in the rejecting group to select 3’s and
a slight tendency for participants in the non-rejecting group to
select 6’s.
The results from the three studies clearly show different
patterns of responses that are simply not detectable in the
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FIGURE 4 | Bubble plots for three samples of participants. Larger bubbles indicate greater numbers of cases.
aggregate statistics or bar charts. What is the experimenter to
do? She could switch to a non-parametric procedure, but there
are clear incentives for not doing so, including the potential
loss of statistical power and the unwarranted perception that
such a switch would indicate weakness in her methods and
results. A median test in fact yields statistical significance for
only the first two data sets. She could switch to a Bayesian
analysis which would permit her to compare means while
also assessing parameters relevant to the distributions of the
samples. For all three data sets the Bayesian analysis in fact
indicates “credible differences” between the group means,
as the Highest Density Interval excluded 0 in each case.
Fundamentally, though, none of these options represents
a departure from the variable-based model in Figure 2
and the goal of estimating parameters. In other words, like
the independent samples t-test, effect size, and confidence
interval these approaches would not require nor encourage the
experimenter to explicate the structures and processes at work in
or outside of her laboratory regarding the human experience of
rejection.
The first step toward a more rigorous analysis of the data that
is also consistent with the types of inferences sought through the
model in Figure 1 is to consider the detection and explanation of
patterns as more generally important than parameter estimation
(see Thorngate, 1986; Manicas, 2006). The experimenter has two
key observations for each participant: (1) whether or not the
participant was rejected, and (2) the participant’s ratings using
the 6-point scale. Here, as above, we will only consider the rating
for popularity, and the two observations together create a simple
two-dimensional array:
Given the experimenter’s choices, then, this array presents
boundaries on the ways she thinks data can be structured, and
it is within this limiting structure she must identify or search for
meaningful and robust patterns of observations.
Deductive, a priori, Pattern Evaluation
If the model in Figure 1 were sufficiently developed, the
experimenter would approach her data in a way most similar to
deductive reasoning. In the parlance of modern research design
and statistical analysis, she would conduct a priori tests of the
model’s accuracy which would require specific predictions about
the observations. Figure 5 shows two example predicted patterns
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FIGURE 5 | Predicted patterns of observations for rejection study. Gray
cells indicate predicted joint observations for group membership and
popularity rating.
using the two-dimensional array above that might be consistent
with the integrated model. The first pattern shows that the
experimenter expects participants in the rejecting group to select
1’s (“I don’t agree at all”) on the 6-point scale and participants
in the non-rejecting group to select 6’s (“I agree strongly”). The
second pattern shows that the rejected participants are expected
to choose values 1, 2, or 3, while the non-rejected participants are
expected to choose values 4, 5, or 6. These patterns are consistent
with the model insofar as rejecting participants are expected to
discount the counterpart, and lower values are interpreted as
indicating negative judgments of low popularity.
Of course other patterns could be put forth as examples, but
the point here is that if the experimenter is to work deductively
and conduct a priori tests, she must develop the integrated model
beyond what is shown in Figure 1. If she continues to employ
a 6-point scale, she must be able to make predictions about
which specific values will be selected by all—or at least a majority
of—her participants. Such predictions will no doubt be difficult
and will require extensive research into how individuals interpret
and respond to the rating scale, but this is the demanding and
often tedious scientific work required for accomplishing a better
understanding of the scale values. By comparison, the variable-
based model and independent samples t-test made few demands
on the experimenter with regard to the meaning of the scale
values, and they moreover required her to assume interval scale
measurement and to assume that popularity itself is structured
as a continuous quantity. No scientific evidence exists for either
of these assumptions, and by thinking of her task as pattern
identification the experimenter can avoid these assumptionswhile
also pushing herself to thinkmore deeply about what her numbers
(i.e., the observations) actually mean.
For the sake of demonstration, let us assume that the second
pattern in Figure 5 is predicted by the integrated model. The
actual observations from the three data sets can then be evaluated
using the OOM software (Grice, 2011). The experimenter first
sets up the two-dimensional array and defines the pattern. The
frequencies are then computed and overlaid in the array, as shown
in Figure 6. These are the primary results to be evaluated by the
experimenter, and it can readily be seen that the observations
FIGURE 6 | Predicted pattern and actual observations for three
samples from the rejection study. Gray cells indicate predicted joint
observations for group membership and popularity rating.
from the first sample do not fit the pattern very well at all.
None of the eighty participants in the rejected condition selected
the 1, 2, or 3 values on the scale; and 16 participants in the
non-rejecting condition selected these values, against expectation.
Almost all of the 160 participants (90%) chose values of 4, 5, or
6. If these numerically high values are interpreted to represent
the participant judging the counterpart as popular, and thus
delivering a positive evaluation, then every person in the rejecting
condition held a favorable attitude toward the counterpart.
Tallying all of the persons who were consistent with the
predicted pattern yields what is known as the percent correct
classification (PCC) index in the OOM software. The PCC index
for the first sample was only 40%, as only 64 of the 160 joint
group/rating observations matched expectation. The PCC index
can range from 0 to 100 and is easily interpretable in light of
Figure 6. A distribution-free randomization test can be conducted
as an aid for interpreting the PCC index, the results of which
are reported as a probability statistic known as the c-value (or
chance-value). Relatively low values indicate the magnitude of the
observed PCC index was not easily equaled or exceeded when
computed from randomized pairings (1000 trials) of the group
and popularity ratings for the 160 participants. For the first sample
the c-value was 1.0 (possible range: 0–1), thus indicating that in
every instance, the PCC index from randomized versions of the
same data equaled or exceeded 40%. The observed PCC index was
therefore not only low, but values at least that high were entirely
ordinary as well.
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The results in Figure 6 for the first sample are in direct
contradiction to any reasonable expectation based on the
integratedmodel. Yet, recall fromTable 1 above the outcome from
the t-test was statistically significant and interpreted as offering
support for the variable-based model because the average rating
for the rejecting group was lower than the average for the non-
rejecting group. The place on the scale this difference occurred
did not matter: the difference between 1 and 2 has the same
meaning as a difference between 3 and 4 in the t-test analysis.With
the OOM analyses, by contrast, the scale values had to be taken
seriously when defining the expected pattern and interpreting the
results.
The second data set also reveals striking results that were
masked by the traditional statistics; specifically, as can be seen
in Figure 6, 48 individuals (60%) in the rejecting condition
rated the counterpart as a six on the 6-point scale. Again,
these observations make no sense in light of the integrated
model. The data for the rejecting condition are moreover split
between the ends of the scale as the remaining 32 individuals
selected 1’s or 2’s. Given this odd pattern the PCC index,
which equals 60% and was unusual compared to randomized
versions of the observations (c-value = 0.003, 1000 trials), is to
be interpreted cautiously or even ignored. More specific analyses
must also be conducted in this case, treating the two groups
separately. The PCC index for the rejecting participants, treated
separately, was only 40% (c-value = 0.98), while the PCC index
for the non-rejected participants was impressively high (80%, c-
value < 0.001). Expectations were therefore largely met for the
non-rejected participants but not for the rejected participants.
Figure 6 shows the results for the third data set to be entirely
unimpressive, even though the t-test was again statistically
significant. As can be seen, a majority of the participants in the
rejecting condition again chose 4, 5, or 6 from the rating scale.
Equal numbers of participants in the non-rejecting condition
chose 4’s and 5’s, and not a single individual from either group
chose 1 or 2. The differences between the groups occurred only
for values of 3 and 6, with more participants in the rejecting
condition choosing 3’s and more participants in the non-rejecting
condition choosing 6’s. The PCC index (55%) indicated that
barely over half of the students were classified correctly which was
even less impressive than the value obtained for the second data
set, even though it was also unusual based on the randomization
test (c-value = 0.06). Again, the results shown in Figure 6 are
primary, and as a general rule in OOM PCC indices and c-values
should never be presentedwithout clear visual displays of the data.
Opposite of NHST, as well, the probability statistic (viz., the c-
value) is the least important bit of information in the analysis,
and in this particular set of analyses it may even be considered
superfluous.
Abductive, post hoc, Pattern Evaluation
The model in Figure 1 does not explicitly predict which values on
the 6-point scale will be chosen by individuals in the two groups.
Without such specificity in the model, the experimenter must
approach the three data sets in amanner consistent with inductive
and abductive reasoning. In the parlance of modern research
design and statistical analysis, she must examine the data post hoc
for robust andmeaningful patterns. She can do so using the OOM
software and what is known as binary Procrustes rotation, which
is a procedure that seeks to rotate one set of observations into
conformity with a second set of observations (Grice, 2011).
Results for the three data sets, displayed as multigrams,
are shown in Figure 7. As can be seen for the first sample,
the multigram is comprised of two aligned histograms for the
rejecting and non-rejecting groups. The bars in the multigram
are shaded or filled on the basis of the Procrustes rotation.
A shaded bar indicates those observations that are considered
correctly classified by the algorithm, while a bar filled with
diagonal lines indicates those observations incorrectly classified.
It is important to keep in mind that the analysis is entirely post
hoc. The observations are classified as correct or incorrect by the
rotation algorithm on the basis of the patterns of frequencies
considered both between groups and across the six scale values.
The experimenter in no way determines how the observations
are expected to be patterned or considered as accurately or
inaccurately classified. She must instead examine the pattern in
the multigram and attempt to draw an inductive generalization
and an abductive explanation.
The multigram for the first sample shows a convincing
pattern with regard to the PCC index (80%). As can be seen
in Figure 7, the largest bars in the multigram are shaded to
indicate the correctly classified observations. The c-value from the
randomization test is also impressively low. Not one time in 1000
trials did randomized versions of the actual observations yield a
PCC index of 80% or more. The pattern is thus unusual, leading
the experimenter to inductively reason that some phenomenon
has potentially been detected. At the same time, the experimenter
is confronted with the pattern in Figure 7 and must work
abductively to explain it. As can be seen, rejected participants
were classified correctly only if they chose 4 on the 6-point scale.
Non-rejected participants were classified correctly if they chose
2, 3, 5, and 6. How does the model in Figure 1 comport with
such a pattern? It is difficult to reconcile this observed pattern
with the structures and processes in the integrated model, but
the experimenter must try to do so. Alternatively, she can seek
to modify the integrated model to explain the pattern. In either
case, she is reasoning abductively as she ultimately seeks to make
an inference to best explanation of the phenomenon she’s detected
through her study.
If the experimenter has all three data sets to work with,
however, it is clear that a single pattern has not emerged. The
multigram for the second sample in Figure 7 shows that, contrary
to the first sample, no participants in the rejecting group selected
4 from the scale; they selected only 1’s, 2’s, or 6’s, with a majority
choosing 6’s. Amajority of participants in the rejected group of the
third sample chose 4’s, but an equal number of participants chose
3’s, 5’s, or 6’s. The distributions of observations across the six scale
points for the non-rejected participants were, by comparison,
more similar across all three samples, although the modes were
different for each. The PCC index for the second sample was high
(75%) and unusual (c-value < 0.001), whereas the PCC index for
the third sample was low (20%) and easily equaled or exceeded by
randomized versions of the data (c-value= 0.98). The pattern for
the third sample also shows ambiguous classifications, indicating
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FIGURE 7 | Multigrams for three samples from the rejection study.
that the algorithm could not clearly distinguish between values of
4 and 5 for the rejected and non-rejected participants. Given the
low PCC index and high c-value for this sample, the experimenter
would interpret these results as not supporting the integrated
model, and the data offer no clear pattern from which to
generalize or alter the model. The relatively impressive individual
results for the second sample would warrant further abductive
attention. Considering all three sets of results together with their
remarkably different patterns, however, may instead decide to
conclude that no phenomenon has been reliably detected.
Discussion
Speelman and McGann (2013) report a number of assumptions
about the mean held by modern psychologists. In light of
the history, models, methodology and data analytic techniques
examined in this paper, perhaps the most troubling assumption
is that “any inability to use the mean as a reliable measure of
a stable characteristic is a product of weakness in methodology
or calculation” (p. 3). This assumption is disturbing for two
reasons. First, how is it possible that one, simple statistic can be
given so much power in the vast domain of scientific inquiry?
Surely the spectacular advances in the fields of biology, chemistry,
physics, andmedicine, with all of their methodological rigor, have
not depended on the lowly mean. The curious elevation of the
mean in psychology as an indicator of rigor or as some type of
“error free value”—or worse, “ideal person”—is the epitome of
what Lamiell (2013) termed “statisticism.” Philosophically, it is
the error of placing methods before metaphysics; in other words,
allowing methods of data collection and analysis to determine
how one builds a model of nature. The practical result of such a
limiting attitude is a guaranteed restriction in the advancement of
psychological science.
Second, the idolatry of the mean is disturbing because it
reveals that psychologists are operating under a quantitative
imperative (Michell, 1999, 2008). What is popularity? What is
rejection? What is the emotion of anger? Under the quantitative
imperative the answer to each of these questions must in some
way invoke the notion of continuous quantity. In other words,
each of these qualities of human experience are presumed to
exist in such a way as to be measurable as continuous quantities.
In the parlance of Steven’s (1946) four scales of measurement,
popularity, rejection, and emotion must be measured as interval
or ratio scales, for it is only with these types of scales that the
computation of a mean is appropriate. Unfortunately, there is no
evidence to date that qualities such as intelligence, depression,
and personality traits (let alone popularity, rejection, or anger)
are structured as continuous quantities, and therefore measurable
as such. As stated by Michell (2011), “There is no evidence that
the attributes that psychometricians aspire to measure (such as
abilities, attitudes and personality traits) are quantitative” (p. 245).
This is again an instance of puttingmethods ahead ofmetaphysics;
that is, of presuming psychological qualities to be measurable
as continuities without substantiating this claim and seriously
considering the possibility that such qualities may be structured
differently.
One need only examine the periodic table of the elements or
the biochemical pathways of a eukaryotic cell to understand that
the scientific study of nature is not restricted to interval and ratio
scaled measurement and parametric statistics. The arguments,
models, and methods, presented in this paper hopefully elucidate
why psychologists should feel confident in venturing beyond
the world of means, variances, and covariances without fearing
a loss of scientific rigor. Placing the integrated model in
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Figure 1 side-by-side with the variable-based model in Figure 2
should be sufficient to convince the reader that theoretical rigor
is in no way tied to an aggregate statistic of any kind. Many of the
components in Figure 1 (e.g., all of the acts of predication and
most acts of judgment) are not even quantitative in nature, thus
precluding the computation of amean and variance. An integrated
model like the one in this paper clearly requires a great deal
more thought and effort to construct, validate, and defend than
a variable-based model (see also Grice, 2011, 2014; Grice et al.,
2012). Indeed, the reader is invited to sketch an integrated model
for his or her most recent study, posited psychological process, or
favorite theory. The task will no doubt prove challenging, but it
will finally heed Meehl’s (1978) call for more serious theorizing
and bolder predictions in psychology. Not by coincidence, in
the same paper Meehl argued that the over-reliance on null
hypothesis significance testing was preventing scientific progress
in psychology,
“I believe that the almost universal reliance on merely
refuting the null hypothesis as the standard method for
corroborating substantive theories in the soft areas is
a terrible mistake, is basically unsound, poor scientific
strategy, and one of the worst things that ever happened in
the history of psychology” (p. 817).
The shift to iconic modeling is also a step toward the
types of inferences psychologists truly wish to make from their
research: abductive inference, inference to best explanation, and
inductive generalization. Variable-based models are meant to
show associations between variables and are poor tools for
explaining the complex structures and processes of nature. The
mean does not provide information about “people in general”
and in fact likely describes no one in particular (Lamiell,
2013). Variable-based models and their accompanying aggregate-
based analyses are therefore not up to the task of delivering
these inferences. When psychologists employ such methods and
tie them to null hypothesis significance testing (traditional p-
values), they are limited to drawing inferences about population
parameters: : :regardless of whether or not they are cognizant of
this fact. Using Haig’s (2005) ATOM, these inferences may be
of value insofar as they are seen as equivalent to phenomenon
detection. The Flynn Effect, for instance, is the phenomenon of
increased scores on intelligence tests over the past 30 years or so
“detected” using aggregate statistics (Haig, 2014). The explanation
of this phenomenon, however, will require a great deal more
work and the construction of an integrated model that details the
structures and processes underlying the Flynn Effect.
Going beyond the world of variable-based modeling and the
computation of means, variances, and other parametric statistics
is not necessarily a leap into the world of Bayesian statistics or
non-parametric analyses; rather, the move is from estimating
parameters in the context of sampling variability (as with an
independent samples t-test) to the analysis of patterns in the
context of explanatory models. Thorngate (1986) wrote plainly,
“The essence of science is the detection and explanation of
patterns” (p. 71), and he wrote this statement in a chapter for
a book titled The Individual Subject and Scientific Psychology
(Valsiner, 1986). Countless students have entered psychology
expecting to study the lives of individuals only to learn that
their task is instead to study variables, aggregates and some non-
existent “average person.” When collecting and analyzing data
they learn that the odd person is a statistical nuisance or outlier
whomust be sacrificed to themean or some statistical assumption
(e.g., homogeneity). After all, the primary goal is to estimate
population parameters, and one cannot let an influential case
or two unduly influence the estimates. In contrast, the methods
shown in this paper represent a return to the person or persons
in psychology. Because these methods are primarily visual in
nature and do not rely on the computation of parametric statistics,
outliers or assumptions of normality, homogeneity, etc., are never
a concern. The Percent Correct Classification index is a simple
frequency, and therefore an aggregate statistic, but it is always
interpreted in light of a pattern (e.g., the a priori pattern or a
multigram) and the complete set of observations. The simple “eye
test” or more severe “interocular traumatic test” (Edwards et al.,
1963) is taken seriously in OOM as there simply is no substitute
for examining the data, particularly in light of an integrated
model.
The final move, then, is from variable-basedmodels to persons.
The example study above employed a between-group design, and
only two pertinent observations were made for each participant.
A more intensive study of the individual is possible, however,
using similar methods to conceptualize and analyze multiple
observations made for each person. Cohn et al. (2014) for
example, collected daily diary ratings from 54 women who had
been raped. Ratings of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
symptoms, drinking behavior, emotional states, and many other
attributes, attitudes or behaviors were collected for 14 consecutive
days. Using the OOM software in a novel analysis of the data,
Grice et al. (in press) were able to examine a mediation model
(PTSD!Negative Affect!Alcohol Consumption) at the level of
the individual women. Unlike the aggregate results obtained from
a variable-based Hierarchical Linear Model, the OOM analyses
identified the individual women whose observations revealed a
causal connection for each link in the model. In the world of
clinical intervention where individuals—not means—are treated,
such techniques are tantamount (Mumma, 2004; Haynes et al.,
2009). Additional examples of person-centered studies using
OOM have been published (e.g., Brown and Grice, 2012; Craig
et al., 2012; Abramson et al., 2015), and methods of data analysis
which permit a dynamic study of individuals have also been
developed (e.g., see Valsiner et al., 2014). The time is therefore ripe
for psychologists to return to a study of the person as an integrated,
individual whole.
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